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DEBTOR AND CREDITOR CONSUMERS AND
THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
Eugene M. Anderson, Jr. *
I.

INTRODUCTION

SocIetIes have long struggled with the problems ansmg when
a debtor can no longer payor perform hIS obligatIon. SolutIons
range from the penodic debt forgIveness, of anCIent HebraIC SOCI
ety 1 to the Impnsonment of the debtor for failure to pay of recent
Anglo-Amencan Junsprudence. 2 ASIde from moral consIderatIons,
both of these alternatIves are unthmkable m modem socIety where
credit plays an Important role. Such chOices excessIvely chill the
use of credit on opposite SIdes of the debtor-creditor relatIonshIp.
To foster credit usage, 3 it IS necessary to at least offer the debtor a
new opportunity m life and a clear field for future effort."4 At the
same tIme, creditors must be gtven some assurance of equality of

Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.A.,
WashIngton and Lee UnIversity, 1952; J.D., Duke UnIversity, 1954; LL.M., UnIver
sity of VirgInIa, 1970.
1. At the end of every seven years thou shalt make release. And thIS 's
the manner of the release: every creditor who lendeth anythmg unto hIS
neIghbor, shall release it; he shall not exact it of hIS neIghbor, or of hIS
brother, because it IS called the Lord' release.
Deuteronomy 15:1 (King James).
Not all of the ancIent world was so debtor onented. The Roman Laws of the
Twelve Tables allowed creditor to take delinquent debtor,
and either tie hIm by the neck, or put Irons upon hIS feet, proVIded the
chaIn does not weIgh above fifteen pounds. If the debtor be Insolvent to
several creditors, let hIS body be cut In pIeces on the thIrd marketday. It
may be cut Into more or fewer pIeces with Impunity· Or, if hIS creditors
consent to it, let hIm be sold to foreIgners beyond the Tiber.
T. COOPER, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 658 (1812).
2. The fate of these unfortunates IS described by Mr. Justice Hyde:
If man be taken In execution and lie In pnson for debt, neither the plaIn
tiff at whose suit he IS arrested, nor the sheriff who took hIm, IS bound to
find hIm meat, dnnk, or clothes; but he must live on hIS own, or on the
charity of others: and if no man will relieve hIm, let hIm die In the name of
God, says the law' and so say I.
Manby v. Scott, 86 Eng. Rep. 781, 786 (Ex. 1663).
3. See generally H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1973) [hereInafter
cited as Comm. Report].
4. Local Loan Co.
Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244, (1933).
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treatment withm theIr category of creditors. Congress, under a
ConstitutIonal grant of authority 5 has gradually developed a solu
tIon to the problem of the msolvent debtor WhICh leaves the
debtor-creditor relatIonshIp structurally unchanged, but substan
tIally alters from ongmal expectatIons the method and substance of
the satIsfactIOn of the debtor s obligatIOn.
Two wIdely diffenng general solutions to the problem of bank
ruptcy have evolved under the statutory scheme. The first, the
chapter proceeding, attempts to rehabilitate the debtor who pays
all, or much, of the debt. The other, the liqUIdatIon proceeding,
protects creditor nghts to the extent possible while gIVmg the
debtor a fresh start. In a liqUIdatIon proceeding, the court
marshalls and liqUIdates the debtor s assets, and applies the re
sulting funds toward the debts. Subsequent JudicIally enforced col
lectIOn of the debts from the debtor personally IS barred.
Through hIStOry the pnmary attentIon of bankruptcy law has
been on busmess bankruptcIes. Consumer credit IS a recent phe
nomenon. The draftsmen of the Bankruptcy CommISSIOn proposed
far-reachmg, radical legIslatIve changes m attemptmg to deal with
the problems of the bankrupt consumerS and consumer creditors.
Only some of these proposed changes survIved the enactment
process. 7 ThIS artIcle exammes the more sIgnificant substantIve
changes 8 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act (the BRA or new Act)
5. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cI. 4.
6. H.R. REP No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1977), repnnted In [1978] 5
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 5964-66 [heremafter cited as House Report].
"Consumers will be used m thIS article to describe mdivlduals whose debts or
claIms m bankruptcy are defined m the new Bankruptcy Act as follows: consumer
debt" means debt mcurred by an mdivldual pnmarily for personal family or house
hold purpose. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(7) (West Supp. 1979) [heremafter referred to as
BRA]. Cf U.C.C. § 9-109(1) (definmg consumer goods m secured transactions).
It IS typIcal of the BRA that its emphaSIS IS on consumer debtors, that IS, bank
rupts rather than consumer creditors who have claIms agamst debtors. "Debtors
IS the term used m the BRA to describe the entity whICh would formerly be called
bankrupt. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(12) (West Supp. 1979); cf Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11
U.S.C. § 1(4) (1976) (repealed 1979). ThIS article will frequently follow the old termI
nology of "bankrupt, the new termmology IS far too ImprecIse. Debtor has many
more generally accepted meanIngs m addition to the new legIslative definition. It IS
unfortunately far from atypIcal of the termmology of the BRA whICh all too often
does not make use of words with well known and specific meanmgs m bankruptcy
law that substitutes mstead termmology with general, ImprecIse meanmg. Alto
gether, the BRA IS extremely difficult to follow as comprehensible pIece of writing.
7 For an excellent, although mcomplete, summary of the hIstory of the BRA
see Frost & King, Congress and Bankruptcy Reform, cIrca 1977 33 Bus. LAw 489
(1978). For subsequent developments see 9 BANKR. SERV (L. ED.) 1-97 (1979).
8. While the line between substance and procedure IS not always clear, the sIg
nificant procedural changes for consumers deserve separate treatment. For example,
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that prmclpally Impact on the mdivldual with debts or claIms
mcurred pnmarily for personal, family or household purposes m a
liqUidation proceeding.
One commentator has stated that the liqUidation bankruptcy
proceeding offers the bankrupt an opportunity to retaIn exempt"
property and, more Importantly to obtaIn the bankruptcy dis
charge. 9 The Bankruptcy Reform Act deals with both of these ob
jectives m significant ways.

II.

EXEMPTIONS

It became generally accepted durIng the nIneteenth century

that certaIn property belongmg to Individuals should not be subject
to levy under Judicial process. 10 This same policy was perceived to
apply to bankruptcy Consequently each of the federal bankruptcy
acts has provided that some property of the bankrupt not be liqUi
dated, but be set aSide for the bankrupt's use.ll Under the Bank
ruptcy Act of 1898, the trustee did not take title to the bankrupt's
exempt property 12 DetermmatIon of exempt status was by the ex
emption from legal process law of the bankrupt's state of domi
cile. 13 Since the admInistratIOn of exempt property was not withIn
the trustee s powers, bankruptcy proceedings became a confused
struggle between claImants with state-recognized nghts In exempt
property trustees with federal Bankruptcy Act nghts, and bank
rupts themselves. 14 The reference to state law for exemptions pro-

the United States trustee system, and the reform of Chapter XIII, wage earner s
plans, to the new Chapter 13, mdivlduals with regular IOcome plans will not be dis
cussed 10 thiS article.
9. Countryman, Consumer Bankruptcy-Some Recent Changes and Some Pro
posals. 19 U. KAN. L. REV 165, 167-68 (1971).
10. Kennedy, LImitation of Exemptions In Bankruptcy, 45 IOWA L. REv 445,
446 (1960). Professor Kennedy traces the development of exemption by the courts.
11. An Act to establish uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United
States, Ch. XIX, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed by An Act to repeal an act, entitled An
act to establish uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States, Ch.
VI, 2 Stat. 248 (1803)); An Act to establish uniform system of bankruptcy through
out the United States, Ch. IX, 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed by An Act to repeal the
bankrupt [SIc] act, Ch. LXXXII, 5 Stat. 614 (1843)). Each of these Acts prOVided ex
emptions 10 the statute. An Act to establish uniform system of bankruptcy through
out the United States, Ch. CLXXVI, 14 Stat. 517 (1867) (repealed by An Act to repeal
the bankrupt [SIC] law, Ch. 160. 20 Stat. 99 (1878)). ThiS Act employed federal ex
emptions as minImUm, and adopted the exemptions of the state of domlcile of the
bankrupt as an alternative.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 70(a)(1976)(repealed 1979).
13. Id. § 6.
14. Countryman, For New Exemption Policy In Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L.
REV 678 (1960); see Kennedy supra note 10, at 453.
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duced extreme vanatIons In the value of property retamed by a
bankrupt In bankruptcy 15
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 Improves and clarifies
substantially the method of dealing with exempt property Title to
all legal or equitable Interests of the bankrupt In property passes to
the trustee. 16 The bankrupt then requests exemption of qualified
property17 by filing a list of that property with the trustee. Unless
objected to by a party m Interest, the trustee will exempt the prop
erty on the bankrupt's list. 18 Property whIch would otherwise qual
ify as exempt, but whICh IS subject to a JudiCIal lien, may be
claImed as exempt and the bankrupt may aVOid the lien to the ex
tent that the property IS exempted. Similarly where exempt
household and personal goods are subject to non-purchase money
security Interests, the security mterest can be aVOIded. 19 Where
property otherwIse exempted has been Involuntarily transferred
and not concealed, the bankrupt or the trustee may aVOid the
transfer and claIm the property Where the trustee has exercIsed
these aVOiding powers, the property may be exempted and clrumed
by the bankrupt. 20 WaIvers of exemption are unenforceable. 21
The Bankruptcy Reform Act also changes the method of
determInIng what property may be exempted. The ongmal Bank
ruptcy CommISSIOn Bill22 sets out a list of allowable federal exemp
tIons 23 whICh was to be the exclUSIve itemIzation of what could be
15. See Countryman, supra note 9, at 167 Professor Countryman uses some
dramatic hypothetical examples whICh illustrate these extremes.
16. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West Supp. 1979).
17 Id. § 552(e).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 522(f). The constitutionality of thiS provISIon may be questioned.
20. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(g)-(j) (West Supp. 1979). The language of these subsec
tions IS obscure. It apparently denves from prOVISIOn m the CommiSSIOn bill whICh
prOVided m clear language that" [nlo property recovered under prOVISIOns of thiS Act
shall be allowed as exempt if the property recovered was concealed or voluntarily
transferred by the debtor, unless so transferred to secure debt and then only to the
extent the value of the property exceeds the debt. Comm. Report, supra note 3, at
125. It IS difficult to see much practical application to the enacted versIOn smce most
of the situations to whICh it would apply mvolve JudiCial liens covered m and pro
Vided by § 522(f)(1).
21. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(e) (West Supp. 1979). Although much mk has been
spilled on the subject, waivers of exemption were valid under state law III very few
mstances.
22. Comm. Report, supra note 3, at 125-27
23. Id. at 125. The report states:
The reference to nonbankruptcy law to detennille the exemptions IS
abandoned to elimmate diversity reduce the amount of litigation havmg no
direct relationship to the policy underlymg exemptions, and because state
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exempted. Many cribcs doubted the ability of a unified, federal
system of exemptions to account for varymg conditions and SOC1al
v1ewpomts of the whole country 24 As enacted, the Bankruptcy Re
form Act allows the bankrupt to choose either the federal exemp
tion plan or the exemption scheme of h1s state of domICile. 25 The
result of th1s 1S to make the federal exemption the floor or bas1c ex
emption. Th1s will compel lawyers for bankrupts to determme total
allowable exemptions under both the federal and state schemes to
Judge whICh plan 1S larger unless the state provISIOns are extremely
generous or mggardly Where federal exemptions are markedly
more generous, the Act encourages voluntary bankruptcy to pro
tect the property whICh otherwIse would be subject to execution
and levy under Judgments m state law 26
III.

DISCHARGE: NEW CONCEPTS TO PROTECT
ITS EFFECTIVENESS

If exemptions g1ve the debtor some mm1mum property with
whICh to begm h1s fresh start, discharge 1S mtended to gIVe h1m
that fresh start. For a var1ety of reasons, however, a debtor 1S often
moved to reaffirm debts whICh would be discharged m a bank
ruptcy proceeding. Th1s reaffirmation of debts whICh 1S then en
forceable 27 senously undercuts the effectiveness of discharge.
exemption laws seem generally archaIc and unduly generous In some states
and exceedingly mggardly, particularly as to urban resIdents, In others.
ld. The policy of the first two bankruptcy acts was followed.
24. See note 10 supra and accompanYIng text.
25. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b) (West Supp. 1979).
26. One apparent weakness In the federal exemptions IS that, follOWIng the
modem trend In such statutes, the exemptions are expressed In dollar amounts
whIch, it IS supposed, will provIde for flexibility In the present vaned, largely urban,
socIety But these dollar amounts are absolute and become qUIckly out of date In pe
nods of hIgh Inflation. The CommIssIOn Bill § 1-105 recogmzed thIS and prOVIded
that the amounts should be adjusted every two years by formula based on the Con
sumer Pnce Index. BRA § 104, reflecting senes of political compromIses, prOVIdes
for adjustments to be recommended by the JudicIal Conference every SIX years with
no standards gIven. 11 U.S.C.A. § 104 (West Supp. 1979). ThIS scheme will shortly
have the exemptions essentially worthless In perIod of double digit Inflation. See,
95 CONGo REC. Hll,049 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
27. The legal baSIS for the enforcement of such reaffirmed debts IS expressed
by the New York Court of Appeals as follows: "[t]he debt IS not paId by the dis
charge m bankruptcy. It IS due m consCIence, although discharged m law and thIS
moral obligation, uniting with the subsequent promIse to pay, creates nght of ac
Davitt, 220 N.Y. 162, 167, 115 N.E. 476,477 (1917). For an out
tion. Herrmgton
standing study of thIS tOPIC see Boshkoff, The Bankrupt' Moral Obligation to Pay
His Discharged Debts: A Conflict Between Contract Theory and Bankruptcy Policy,
47 IND. L.J. 36 (1971). See also lA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 11 17.33, at 1753 (14th
ed. 1971) [heremafter cited as Collier].
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While some bankrupts may feel that they should reaffirm
those debts they can pay payment may always be made without
reaffirmation. The fact that the vast majority of bankruptcIes are
voluntary28 suggests that most petitioners seek discharge relief.
Thus, reaffirmation may not be motivated so much by a feeling of
moral obligation as by some form of direct or mdirect creditor
pressure.
The 1970 amendments 29 to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 have
been cited as allevIating thIS problem. 30 TheIr effectIveness, how
ever IS limited. 31 The pertment amendments provIded for a deter
mmatIon m bankruptcy court of the dischargeability of certam
debts, and prohibited use of any "action or "process" to collect
debts that are determmed discharged. ThIs left a large range of
creditor action available, mcluding overt harassment. If the cred
itor could persuade the debtor to make a new promIse after dis
charge, thIs promIse would be enforceable. 32
A number of situations whICh are particularly sensitive to cred
itor pressure have been Identified and are dealt with m the new
Act. For example, a lender may hold a security mterest m exempt
household and personal goods of the debtor Such goods were sub
Ject to reposseSSIon by the lender after bankruptcy under the old
Act. When the replacement cost of such goods was hIgh, even
though theIr value was low m companson with the debt owed, the
28. In 1976 voluntary liqUidation bankruptcies totaled 207,926; mvoluntary liq
Uidation bankruptices, 1,141. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, 1978 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 14 (1978). These figures are rep
resentative of recent years.
29. Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-466, 84 Stat. 990.
30. Twmem, Bankruptcy Report: Some LImitations on Creditors Rights, 29
Bus. LAw 353,364 (1974).
31. See House Report, supra note 6, at 163, repnnted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6124.
32. The BRA recogmzes the distinction between legal action or other acts
aimed at mducmg the debtor to pay discharged debt and the legal reaffirmation of
the debt glvmg nse to new legal cause of action. The BRA not only enJoms "[c]om
mencement or continuation of any action, the employment of process but also, any
act, to collect
any [discharged]
debt as personal liability of the debtor
11 U.S.C.A. § 524(a)(2) (West Supp. 1979) The House Report pomts out that thiS IS
an expansIOn of the old Act to cover "[a]ny act to collect, such as dunnmg by tele
phone or letter, or mdirectly through fnends, relatives, or employers, harassment,
threats of reposseSSIOn, and the like. House Report, supra note 6, at 366 repnnted
In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6321-22. The Report agreed that
"[t]he change IS consonant with the new policy forbidding bmding reaffirmation
agreements
but it IS not the same thmg and only has the same goal "to msure
that once debt IS discharged, the debtor will not be pressured m any way to repay
it. ld.
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debtor was frequently mduced to reaffirm the entire debt rather
than lose hIs property 33
The BRA deals with thIs problem m two ways m additIon to
the antIreaffirmatIon prOVISIon. Under subsectIon 522(£)(2),34 a
nonpurchase money security mterest m exempt household goods
may be aVOided by the debtor Secondly under sectIon 722, tangI
ble personal property mtended pnmarily for personal, family or
household use, whICh IS exempted or abandoned by the trustee as
bemg of mconsequentIal value to the estate, may be redeemed by
the debtor from a lien secunng a dischargeable consumer debt.
Operation of thIs redemptIon prOVlSlon reqmres valuatIon of the
collateral and the estate s mterest m it to determme the extent of
the secured clrum under the BRA sectIon 506. 35 The secured claIm
of the creditor may not exceed the valuation of the estate s mterest
m the collateral. Any excess of the clrum that remruns IS regarded
as an unsecured clrum. The debtor may redeem the collateral prop
erty by paymg the holder of the lien the amount of the secured
claIm allowed. 36 The concept of a secured creditor IS Irrelevant.
Where the amount of the security mterest IS equal to the valuatIon
of the collateral, or the amount of the security mterest and the
available exemptIon are equal to the collateral valuatIon, the debtor
SImply pays the amount of the security mterest to the secured
party and redeems the collateral. 37
33. Even though the debt mIght be discharged, the lien or security mterest was
not so discharged, and to the extent not aVOIded, could be enforced agamst both the
exempt and nonexempt property of the debtor.
34. See text accompanymg note 19 supra.
35. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506 (West Supp. 1979). The House Report, commenting on
the valuation prOVISIOn of thIS section explamed: 'Value does not necessarily con
template forced sale or liqUIdation value of the collateral; nor does it always Imply
full gomg concern value. Courts will have to determme value on case-by-case ba
SIS, takmg mto account the facts of each case and competing mterests m the case.
House Report supra, note 6, at 356, repnnted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 5963, 6311-12. See also S. REP No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), re
pnnted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787 5854. The Senate Bill
would not have adopted thIS standard but would have reqUIred the reclalmmg debtor
to pay "fau value. S. 2266, 95th Congo 1st Sess. (1978). T the effect that "fau
value was used mtentionally, see S. REP No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 381 (1978).
The enacted verSIOn would seem to make possible squeezmg of the secured cred
itor.
36. 11 U.S.C.A. § 722 (West Supp. 1979).
37 Comm. Report, supra note 3, § 4-504, at 130 n.2. It IS mteresting to specu
late that, even if not eligible for exemption, such consumer goods collateral fully
subject to security mterest may and perhaps should, be abandoned by the Trustee
under § 554 as of mconsequential value to the estate, thereby makmg it eligible for
redemption under § 722. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 554, 722 (West Supp. 1979).
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Where the total exemption amount allowed together with the
amount of the secured claIm IS not as great as the valuation as
SIgned the collateral, the analYSIS IS less clear. Assume that the col
lateral IS an automobile valued at $2,500 and there IS a secured bal
ance owmg on the purchase pnce of $1,200. The debtor may
exempt an additional $1,200, leavmg an mterest m the estate of
$100. May the trustee force a sale of the vehICle and force the
debtor to replace it at a hIgher pnce? While it IS true that the
valuation could take care of thIS problem, replacmg a car almost al
ways costs more than appraIsers will allow on an eXIstmg one. It IS
also true that the secured party has no leverage to force reaffirma
tion m thIS situation, but surely the redemption prOVlSlon has a
broader reach than thIS.38
Another example of a reason why debtors may reaffirm a
dischargeable debt IS to obtam a new loan from a pnor lender who
would, were it not for the reaffirmation, have collection of the
earlier debt barred. The House Report expressed hope that such
pressure to obtam new money Immediately after bankruptcy would
be alleViated by the new federal exemption floor prOVIded m the
BRA section 522.39 ThIS hope IS of doubtful validity
38. See Comm. Report, supra note 3, at 276. The Committee Report uses the
follow1Og example:
[T]he debtor owned $2,000 car, subject to $1,200 lien, the debtor could
exempt hiS $800 10terest 10 the car. The debtor IS permitted $1,500 exemp
tion 10 car,
[$1,200 10 the Act as passed.] ThiS section permits him to
pay the holder of the lien $1,200 and redeem the entire car, not Just the re
ma1010g $700 of hiS exemption. The redemption IS accomplished by paY10g
the holder of the lien the amount of the allowed claim secured by the lien.
The proVISIOn amounts to nght of first refusal for the debtor 10 consumer
goods that might otherwise be repossessed. The nght of redemption under
thiS section IS not walvable.
House Report, supra note 6, at 381, repnnted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & An.
NEWS 5963, 6337. The Bankruptcy CommissIOn would not have given any broader
effect to its predecessor version of § 722. The CommissIOn po1Oted out that the
debtor may purchase at the trustee sale, whICh it apparently felt was suffiCient pro
tection. Comm. Report, supra note 3, at 1130.
39. House Report, supra note 6, at 163, repnnted Itl [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo
& AD. NEWS 5963, 6124. An mteresting contrast 10 comments on these generally
agreed reasons for reaffirmation may be seen 10 the House Report whICh may be
charactenzed on thiS pomt as writing from the perspective of the debtor and Mr.
Twmem. See note 30 supra at 365. Mr. Tw10em makes fasc10ating argument from
creditor viewpomt. Pomting out that the debtor IS not unlikely to need cash and IS
willing to enter mto new transaction covenng both the old debt and new loan to
get it, he concludes:
ThiS IS
practical consideration. If the old debt could not be affirmed,
lender could not advance additional cash on new loan without cancelling
the pnor loan. If he did not cancel, the borrower would be mdebted on two
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One of the greatest areas of abuse anses out of the fact that if
a debtor gIves a false or mcomplete financIal statement to obtam a
loan, that debt may be exempt from discharge. 40 While m some
cases the debtor IS deliberately unfaithful, conSIderable eVidence
eXists that some unscrupulous lenders encourage falsification to
protect theIr mterest from discharge m a bankruptcy proceeding. 41
Such eVIdence led to the 1970 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 prOVIding that the creditor who contended hIS debt was
nondischargeable for falsification must have the dischargeability de
termmed by the bankruptcy court. 42
The House Committee concluded that, despite the amend
ment, some creditors mIght threaten to have the debt excepted
from discharge and force the debtor to choose between paymg the
costs of litIgatIon to determme dischargeability (or perhaps havmg
hIS discharge held up for one disputed debt), and settling the claIm
by reaffirmmg all or part of the debt. 43 The CommISSIOn Bill re
solved the problem of creditor encouraged falsificatIon by elimI
natmg the exceptIon from discharge where the debt m questIon
was a consumer debt. 44 ThIS change was met with predictable op

contracts of loan at the same time In VIOlation of the Small Loan Laws. Un
less cancelled the old loan must be paId off by the proceeds from the new
loan.
TWInem, supra note 30, at 365. It IS hard to see how thiS could prevail agaInst bank
ruptcy policy Both the Senate and House Reports conclude, "In effect, the discharge ex
S. REP No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1978), reprinted In
tingUishes the debt
[1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787, 5865-67. House Report supra note 6,
at 365, reprinted In [1978) 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, 5963, 6320-21. Sec
tion 366 deals with the special situation of utility servICe. 11 U.S.C.A. § 366 (West
Supp. 1979). While much of the applicability of the section IS to trustee continuIng
bUSIness under Chapter proceedings, by its tenns the section also applies to debt
ors (bankrupts) and prohibits utility from a1tenng, refUSIng or discontinuIng service,
or discnmInation agaInst debtor. ld. The legislative history of the section Indicates
that utility means one whICh has monopoly supplier position. House Report, supra
note 6, at 350, reprinted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 5963, 6306. The
debtor must furnish adequate assurance of payment of past bankruptcy debts withIn
20 days of the begInnIng of the bankruptcy. The obvIOUS Implication of the section IS
that non-utility suppliers can refuse to deal with debtor-bankrupt, so the pressure
for reaffinnation may still be great.
40. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
41. See House Report, supra note 6, at 163, reprinted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6124.
42. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. § 17c(3) (1976) (repealed 1979); lA Col
lier, supra note 27, ~ 17,28A, at 1725; Comm. Report, supra note 3, at 306.
43. House Report, supra note 6, at 163-64, reprinted In (1978) 5 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6124.
44. Comm. Report, supra note 3, § 4-506(a)(2), at 136 n.2.
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posihon45 and was not mcluded m the Bankruptcy Judges Bi1l46 or
the BRA subsectIon 523(a)(2).
Under the BRA, a creditor who loses a bId to have a consumer
debt found nondischargeable for bemg mduced by a false financIal
statement must pay the costs and attorneys fees mcurred by the
debtor m opposmg the creditor 47 ThIS removes the concern of the
honest debtor willing to submit to litIgatIOn over costs of that litIga
hon msofar as those costs were a factor m mducmg reaffirmatIon.
Monetary costs, however, may not be the major factor for reaffir
matIon. The tIme lost and the delay m the proceedings may be of
equal or greater sIgnificance to the debtor 48
As a last example of reasons for reaffirmatIon, when an obliga
tion IS co-sIgned by a fnend or a relatIve of the debtor the debtor
may reaffirm to protect the co-obligor from bemg reqUired to pay
the obligation. While the new Act offers a solutIon m Chapter 13
cases, it IS plam that thIS leverage will contmue to encourage reaf
firmation m liqUidatIon proceedings. 49
The Bankruptcy CommISSIOn felt that the frustration of the
"fresh start" goal by reaffirmatIon of debts was senous enough to
deserve elimmatIon by an absolute prohibition agamst reaffirm a

45. See, e.g., note 30 supra, at 363.
46. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 95(b)(2) (1975).
47 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(d) (West Supp. 1979).
48. The Bankruptcy CommIssIOn Report concluded:
One of the more troublesome exceptions to discharge under the present Act
IS the nondischargeability of consumer debt obtamed by the use of false
financIal statement. Substantial eVIdence of the abuse of thIS exception by
creditors has come to the attention of the CommISSIon. The exception has
also generated substantial amount of litigation and has partially frustrated
the "fresh start" goal of the discharge. On balance, the abuses and the harm
ful effects far outweIgh the benefit to creditors by thIS exception. No eVI
dence has come to the CommIssIOn attention that mdicates the exception
has any prophylactic effect.
Comm. Report supra note 3, at 176 (footnotes omitted). On the other hand, some
creditors saw it differently·
[Debtors]
were apprehenSIve that if they gave truthful statement, the
credit would be demed.
When confronted with the false finanCIal state
ment either directly or often through theIr attorney, they realize theIr wrong
domg and are willing to reaffirm theIr obligation. In other cases, the attor
ney for the lender and the bankrupt' attorney will conclude that it IS likely
that the lender will prevail m case of suit (now on Nondischargeable Ap
plication), and so they will agree on terms of settlement.
Twmem, supra note 30, at 364.
49. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (West Supp. 1979) prOVIdes for stay of action agamst
nonprofeSSIOnal co-debtor of consumer debtor, but BRA § 524(e) makes plam that
such relief does not apply m liqUIdation.
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tIon. 50 Hence, Bill 8200 had a sImilar prohibition; however, reaf
firmatIon m a settlement of a proceeding to determme the
discharge ability of the reaffirmed debt and reaffirmatIOn m a re
demptIon agreement were vIewed as desIrable exceptIons to the
prohibitIon. 51 It was apparently felt that the controls and limita
tIOns placed by the new proposals on these motIvatIons for reaffir
matIon were sufficIent to obvIate the burden whICh mIght be
placed on the "fresh start.
The BRA subsectIons 524(c) and (d) further retreat from the
CommISSIOn S recommendatIOn of complete prohibitIon. Reaffirma
tIon agreements are permitted, but agreement must be entered
mto before discharge and must be followed by a thIrty day
cooling-off" penod after the agreement would otherwIse become
enforceable dunng whICh tIme the debtor may rescmd hIS reaffir
matIon. 52
If the debtor IS an mdividual, before the reaffirmation IS al
lowed, the court must gIve advIce about its effect and the lack of
legal reqUIrement for it. Furthermore, if reaffirmatIon of a con
sumer debt5 3 not secured by real property IS at Issue, the court
must find that it will not Impose undue hardshIps on the debtor or
defendants and IS m the debtor s best mterests. On the other hand,
if the reaffirmation IS part of a settlement of false finanCIal state
ment litIgation or IS part of a redemptIon agreement, the court IS
reqUIred to find only that the settlement or agreement has been
entered mto m good faith.
SO. Comm. Report, supra note 3, § 4-S07(a), at 142. Although the section con
tams cross-references to §§ 4-504(b) and 4-S06(b) whICh might be thought exceptions,
note to that Section explams:
Neither section upholds the reaffinnation of an extingUished debt. Section
4-504(b) pennits the enforcement of an agreement whICh m effect enables
the debtor to purchase collateral secunng dischargeable consumer debt.
Section 4-506(b) allows, with safeguards protecting the debtor, the enforce
ment of an agreement settling whether or not debt IS dischargeable.
Comm. Report, supra note 3, at 143 n.2.
51. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 524(b)-(c) (1978), House Report supra
note 6, at 366, repnnted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6321-22.
In fact, both of these exceptions were part of the CommisSIOn proposals despite the
denIal of their exceptional result. See note 23, s.upra. The language of the Senate Bill
was Identical, S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978), but was subsequently amended.
95th CONGo REc. H11,096 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
52. It IS mteresting to note that
creditor advocate proposed
consumer
cooling-off penod of 48 hours Similar to the nght to disaffirm contract entered mto
at [the consumer s] place of reSidence through
door-to-door salesman. Twmem,
supra note 30, at 366.
53. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(7) (West Supp. 1979).
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ThIS does not seem sound. There may be good reason to allow
reaffirmatIon agreements under supervIsIon of the court m the set
tlement of false statement litIgatIon and redemptIOns, but the hard
shIp and best mterest standards, rather than a nebulous good
faith" standard, should be Imposed here where they have meamng
relatIve to the Issues bemg litIgated. 54 HardshIp and best mterest
standards, when applied to other reaffirmatIons, are subjectIve and
largely depend on the moral chOices and viewpomts of the bank
ruptcy Judge for content, and they may prove as nebulous as good
faith." The reqmrement that court supervIsed reaffirmatIOn may be
made only before discharge IS granted should have a salutary effect
m preventmg blatant creditor pressure, but the standards for court
gmdance are vague. The sectIon suffered much m the compromIses
made by the Congress.
IV

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE BANKRUPT

After bankruptcy many have found that theIr fresh start has
not been so fresh because bankruptcy often carnes with it a stIgma
of Irresponsible behavIOr. Congress sought to alleVIate thIS stIgma
somewhat by the new legIslatIon. The Bankruptcy CommIssIOn ver
Sion of the antIdiscnmmatIon prOVISIOn would have outlawed any
discnmmatory treatment of an mdividual because of mvolvement m
a bankruptcy proceeding. 55 The enacted legIslatIon, BRA sectIon
525, verbosely outlaws only governmental discnmmatIon m grants
of pnvilege and employment.
The House Report suggests that the difference between the
prOVISIOn enacted and the CommISSIon proposal IS merely that the
latter would have extended the prohibitIon to any discnmmatIon,
even by pnvate partIes, whereas the enacted verSIOn applies only
to governmental units. 56 In fact, the enacted verSIOn IS much nar
rower than the House Report suggests. First, it applies to only two
actIvitIes: denymg, revokmg or discnmmatmg m governmental
grants of pnvilege, and denymg, termmatmg or discnmmatmg m
employment. Furthermore, it IS forbIdden only when these actIVI
tIes are done solely because of mvolvement m bankruptcy or fail
ure to pay a discharged debt.
54. The tenn 1S not defined, but commerc1al lawyers are familiar with the
largely meanmgless "honest-m-fact" standard of U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
55. H. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-508 (1975). The Comm1sslOn Bill went on to
prov1de that other factors such present or prospective financ1al condition or mana
genal ability
could be cons1dered. Id.
56. House Report, supra note 6, at 367, reprinted In [1978) 5 U.S. CODE CONGo
& AD. NEWS 5963, 6322-23.
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The House further mdicates that the sectIon codifies Perez v.
Campbell. 57 That result, however IS largely codified elsewhere m
the BRA. 58 The Perez decIsIOn held that a state could not employ its
Motor VehICle Responsibility Law to coerce payment of a discharged
debt, m that case, a Judgment ansmg out of a motor vehICle aCCI
dent. The antIdiscnmmatIon sectIon obvIOusly exceeds Perez, but en
compasses more than the holding III ways that are unclear It applies
to demal of governmental pnvileges and employment where the
demal IS solely due to mvolvement In a bankruptcy proceeding.
The questIon follows, May bankruptcy Involvement be conSIdered
at all? For example, May state bar exammers ask applicants ques
tIons about pnor bankruptCIeS? May thIs have any relevance? The
language of the CommISSIOn Bill would have answered these ques
tIons negatIvely The legIslatIve hIstory of the BRA also tends to
ward a negatIve answer 59 The literal language of the Act, how
ever, seems to prohibit such conduct only where the conduct IS
based completely on such Involvement. It IS unlikely that a com
plamant would be able to show that the sole conSIderatIon m
denymg a license and In termmatmg or refusmg employment was
mvolvement m a bankruptcy proceeding. The legIslatIve hIstory of
the antIdiscnmInatIon sectIon mdicates, however that the Intended
thrust of the sectIon was to limit specific kmds of actIon by govern
ment defendants, rather than to emphasIze the exclUSIvity of the
57 402 u.S. 673 (1971). The thrust of the case IS that by requmng judgment
debtor, m an action ansmg out of motor vehIcle aCCIdent to pay the judgment as
condition for mamtammg valid dnver license, even though the judgment debt IS
discharged m bankruptcy, the state frustrates the congressIOnal purpose and mter
feres with the operation of the bankruptcy laws. Therefore, regardless of the laud
able purpose of the state, such law offends the supremacy clause and IS constitu
tionally mvalid. T the extent that it IS an act whICh operates to collect discharged
debt, it IS enjomed by the BRA. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(a)(2) (West Supp. 1979). T the
extent that it IS reaffirmation of such debt, it would have to pass the prereqUIsite
to validity posed by the BRA. [d. at § 524(c), see note 54 supra.
58. T the extent that it operates to collect discharged debt, the discnmma
tory activity IS enjomed by the BRA. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(a)(2) (West Supp. 1979). In
that it IS reaffirmation of such debt, it would have to pass the BRA stramer. 11
U.S.C.A. § 524(c) (West Supp. 1979). See text accompanymg note 54 supra.
59. [P]rohibition extends only to discnmmation or other action based
solely on the baSIS of the bankruptcy, on the baSIS of msolvency before or
dunng bankruptcy pnor to determmation of discharge, or on the baSIS of
nonpayment of debt discharged m the bankruptcy case (the Perez situa
tion). It does not prohibit consIderation of other factors, such as future finan
CIal responsibility or ability, and does not prohibit Imposition of reqUIre
ments such as net capital rules, if applied mdiscnmmatorily
House Report, supra note 6, at 366-67, repnnted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 5963, 6321-23.
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reason for the discnmmatIon. There IS a clear mvitatIon m the leg
IslatIve hIstory for the courts to consIder the Issue broadly' "[T]he
section IS not exhaustive. The enumeratIon of vanous forms of dis
cnmmatIon agamst former bankrupts IS not mtended to permit
other forms of discnmmatIon. "60 The wording of the sectlOn IS far
from clear and its effectIveness IS very much m doubt.
V

CONSUMER CREDITORS

Consumers may be creditors Just as any other entity may be a
creditor, but mdividuais m pursuit of personal, family or household
purposes may unwittmgly become creditors of a bankrupt m un
conventional ways. These mdividuais may not even thmk of them
selves as creditors. They are certamly not eqmpped by vIrtue of
then creditor position to protect themselves by usmg the knowl
edge tyPICal of a commercIal lender In limited areas, the Bank
ruptcy Reform Act has mcreased protectIon for these "consumer
creditors.
A troublesome problem mvolvmg consumer purchasers and
lessees anses where the bankrupt IS a seller or lessor who has
taken a down payment or security deposit on the purchase of con
sumer goods or rental property 61 Under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act,
a trustee could disaffirm a contract for the sale of goods and reduce
the purchaser to the status of an unsecured claImant for the
amount paId towards the pnce. 62 ConsIder the heartrending hy
pothetical of a poor couple who has struggled to make the
down payment on a "layaway" of Chnstmas toys for the children,
only to be depnved of the money and the toys upon bankruptcy of
the toy store before the toys are completely paId for and delivered.
It IS cold comfort for the poor couple to be told that they are now
60.

House Report, supra note 6, at 367, repnnted m [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo

& AD. NEWS 5963, 6323; S. REp No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1978), repnnted
m [1978] 5 V.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787, 5867.
61. The mterrelationshlp between bankruptcy and V.C.c. § 2-502 offered little
help for the typIcal consumer purchaser, whatever the effectiveness of the V.C.C.

section In other contests, and thIS has been matter of much dispute. Countryman,
Buyers and Sellers of Goods m Bankruptcy, 1 N.M.L. REV 1435 (1971); see Schrag &
Ratner, Caveat Emptor-Empty Coffer· The Bankruptcy Law Has Nothmg to Of
fer 72 COLUM. L. REv 1147, 1157 (1972). The buyer must show that (1) the debtor
Insolvency occurred within ten days after the first Installment of thIS purchase was
paId, and (2) that the goods had been Identified to the contract of sale. V.C.C. §
2-502.
62. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 V.S.C. § 110(b) (1976) (repealed 1979); see, e.g.,
In re Faber Inc., 360 F Supp. 946 (D. Conn. 1973). Countryman, Executory Con
tracts m Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv 439 (1973).
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unsecured creditors of the toy store. They are unlikely to under
stand how to pursue theIr claim havmg never thought of them
selves as creditors at all. Nor are they likely to realize enough m a
distributIon to unsecured creditors to purchase replacement toys.
Such stones have moved many a law student to protest that thiS
area of bankruptcy IS partIcularly harsh on the unsuspectmg public.
Unfortunately although thiS situatIon probably occurs many tImes
m real life, the amounts mvolved rarely lead to reported cases. 63
The problem IS not limited to "layaway purchases, but m
cludes many different situatIons, for example, prepaid appliance
service repaIr contracts, prepaid contracts for other services such as
dance lessons or exercise courses, and deposits made on merchan
dise to be delivered subsequently
Security deposits made by tenants to a lessor who subse
quently becomes bankrupt IS a Similar situatIon. Here, fortunately
the need for a remedy IS not so acute. 64 Some states have enacted
legislatIon makmg these deposits a trust fund to whICh the lessor
holds only legal title. 65 Trust property IS not part of the bankrupt's
estate under the 1898 Act and the trustee receives only bare legal
title under the Bankruptcy Reform Act. 66 Moreover, under the
63. See House Report, supra note 6, at 188, repnnted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6148-49. In testimony before the CongressIOnal
Committee, witnesses used the much publiCIzed W T. Grant & Co. bankruptcy to
illustrate the POInt. The more recent J. M. Fields Co. bankruptcy IS also on POInt.
64. See generally 4A Collier, supra note 27, 11 70.44, at 539.
65. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 186, § 15B(I)(e) (West 1977); N.Y.
[GEN. OBLIG.} LAw § 7-103 (McKinney 1978).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (1976) (repealed 1979). ThIS assumes that the debtor has
complied with the law and segregated the trust funds. ThIS IS dubIOUS assumption
In the case of failing lessor; all too frequently it IS suspected that the best the les
see can hope for will be that the debtor has commmgled the funds with other gen
eral busmess cash deposits. If so, the IntrICate rules of tracIng apply
Whether the bankruptcy court will apply federal equity law or state law m
resolvmg the difficult tracmg problems has not been .authoritatively settled. 4A Col
lier, supra note 27 11 70.25 at 339. It has been suggested:
State law, mcluding its common law, must generally determme whether
trust relation eXIsted and whether the cestuI has suffiCIently Identified the
trust property
There IS no general federal law of trusts. But the prob
lem does not end at thiS pomt. There IS the further question, and thiS fed
eral one: What IS the distribution contemplated by the Bankruptcy Act In the
situation at bar? State trust law must not be allowed to pervert or overrIde
the distributive proVISIOns of the Bankruptcy Act. A state rule whICh pur
ports to fasten general lien on person estate m the event of msolvency
or general liqUIdation must be regarded as pnority m disgUIse and In
compatible with the order of distribution prescribed for bankruptcy [The
Bankruptcy Act}
Intended to make clear that state rules of pnority of dis
tribution must Yield m bankruptcy cases to that prescribed m the Act.
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BRA, if the lessor s trustee rejects the lease, the lessee has the
nght to mamtam posseSSiOn of the rental property agamst the trust
ee, or treat rejectIon as termmatIon of the lease67 and offset rental
and other amounts due the lessor at the hme of bankruptcy agamst
the net amount of the security deposit. 68 These solutIons, however,
fall far short of complete protectIon of tenants, because trust fund
protectIOn IS available only where legIslatures have acted. Tenants
may not Wish to mamtam posseSSiOn if servIces are term mated, 69
~ 70.25, at 363-64, Annot., 17 A.L.R. 3d 937 (1968); lA. SCOTT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS, § 86.1, at 659 (3rd ed. 1967).
67 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(h) (West Supp. 1979).
68. 11 U.S.C.A. § 553(a) (West Supp. 1979).
69. The BRA makes plam that tenant who chooses to remaIn In possessIOn for
the balance of the term of the lease after the lessor trustee has rejected the lease
may offset, agaInst the rent due, damages occurnng after rejection caused by nonper
formance of obligations m the lease. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(h) (West Supp. 1979). It must
be remembered that lease IS both conveyance of real property and contract. As
Professor Powell has expressed:
In practice, the law today concernmg estates for years consists chiefly of
rules determIning the construction and effect of lease covenants. Thus the
background of lease as conveyance, built solidly by 1500, has tremen
dous foreground, evolved largely since 1880, whICh IS purely contractual In
character. The modem law IS the synthesIs of these two hlstoncal factors.
Sometimes the background peeks through and controls. Sometimes the fore
ground IS alone conSidered as determinative. The lawyer problem IS to de
termine whICh of these two factors IS to control In hiS specific controversy
2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, ~ 221[1], at 181 (1977). ThiS dual nature was recog
mzed by the 1898 Act with the provISIon In § 70b whICh proVided that
rejection
of such lease or any covenant therein by the trustee of the lessor does not depnve
the lessee of hiS estate. 11 U.S.C. § 1l0(b) (1976) (repealed 1979). While thiS much
was clear, little else was. See, e.g., Siegel, Landlord' Bankruptcy: A Proposal for
Treatment of the Lease by Reference to Its Component Elements, 54 B.U.L. REv
903 (1974). The proVISIOns permitting offset of damages for failure to perform land
lord covenants of rejected lease clarify the area so far as the lessee IS concerned; it
may be unfalf to the creditors and WIndfall to the tenant. As an illustration, assume
that at the time of the lease the monthly rent IS set at $500 with $250 of that allo
cated to the cost of prOVISIOns of services. At the time of the bankruptcy, the cost of
servICes has Increased to $300, and so has the value of the occupancy of the prem
Ises, for total of $600. If the lessee offsets the servICe substitute cost of $300, how
ever, he will be obligated to pay only $200 net rent for hiS occupancy. While it may
be argued that, In fact, thiS IS all the Interest the bankrupt lessor had, it hardly seems
fair that the lessee should come out so much better than others dealing with the
bankrupt. It would seem that thiS situation IS
result of the congressIOnal drafts
men failure to conSider the rather umque charactenstics of lease as not just an
executory contract. The language of the BRA IS equally illustrative of thiS pOint. 11
U.S.C.A. § 365(f)(2) (West Supp. 1979). If applied literally it will never allow the trus
tee of lessor In liqUidation proceding to reject the lease SInce he must assume the
lease In order to assign it. [d. ThiS works well enough In the usual executory con
tract when performance will cease by both parties to the contract if rejected, but it IS
not appropnate where the lessee may remain In posseSSIOn of the premises and must
then continue to pay rent. The Bankruptcy CommiSSIOn eVidently conSidered thiS
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and the offset offered under the BRA may be msufficIent.
It seems that the BRA subsectIon 507(a)(5) offers substantIal
help to consumers who become unwittmg unsecured creditors
when the trustee disaffirms executory contracts mvolvmg the pur
chase or lease of property or servlCes for personal, family or house
hold use. The subsection gIves such creditors a fifth pnority for
claIms up to a total amount of $900 resulting from retamed deposits
for goods and servIces not delivered or provIded. Since the debtors
mvolved are usually busmess bankrupts with assets, and smce the
categones of unsecured creditors havmg greater pnority are lim
ited,70 the fifth pnority consumer creditor has a sIgnificant chance
of recovery Moreover, under BRA subsection 724(b)(2), tax liens
are "postponed" until the first five pnority claImants are paId, and
property subject to a tax lien IS used first to satIsfy these claIms to
the extent of the amount of the tax lien. 71
Similar problems mvolvmg real estate purchase contracts or
other arrangements where the buyer does not receIve the property
until the purchase pnce IS completely paid are not resolved by the
fifth pnority for consumer deposits up to $900 because larger
amounts of money are usually m Issue. The purchaser m these situ
ations has merely an executory contract subject to rejectIon by the
trustee. 72
problem. It proVIded m its bill, that rejection of lease abandoned the leased prop
erty to the lessee rather than causmg breach of the lease. H. 31, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 4-602(c) (1975). The CommIssIOn commented:
[ThIS prOVISIon]
obVIates the need to distingUIsh between leased
covenants that are part of the estate of the lease and those that are not. As
result, the court IS not mvited to reform the lease agreement entered by
the parties. Instead the lessor trustee, or the debtor m posseSSIOn, IS called
upon to compare the negative value of an unprofitable lease with the re
mammg value of the leased property. If the outcome shows negative net
value, he should abandon the leased property to the lessee. Abandonment IS
not breach of the lease, however, and the lessee recelvmg the abandoned
property IS not permitted claIm for loss of bargam.
Comm. Report, supra note 3, § 4-602, at 157 n.12.
70. Admmlstrative expenses have first pnority m distribution to unsecured
creditors. The second pnority goes to claIms, surely of limited number, whICh anse
after the commencement of the case m an mvoluntary bankruptcy, but before the ap
pomtment of trustee. ThIrd and fourth pnorities are allowed for wage claIms of,
and contributions to, employee benefit plans of the bankrupt. These are subject to
substantial limitations. II U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(I)-(4) (West Supp. 1979).
71. A SImilar concept was embodied m The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 67(c),
whICh postponed" non-possessory tax liens 'on personal property to the claIms of
first and second pnority creditors. II U.S.C. § 107(c) (1976) (repealed 1979).
72. In re New York Investors Mut. Group, Inc., 143 F Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y.
1956) (applymg The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 70b); See 4A Collier, supra note 27, ~
70.43 n.16, at 522.
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New provIsIOns of the BRA substantially paralleling those deal
mg with leaseholds mitigate the harshness of the doctnne of rejec
tion where the purchaser IS m possessIOn. 73 The purchaser may
termmate hIs obligations and receIve a lien on the property m the
amount of the purchase pnce already paId,74 or he may remam m
posseSSIOn and contmue to make purchase payments, offsettmg
damages caused after rejection by the debtor s nonperformance un
der the contract. There IS no other liability on the estate for dam
ages. The nght of offset IS the purchaser s only remedy 75 Upon
completion of payments, the purchaser IS to receIve title from the
trustee. These prOVISIons seem to enVISIon chapter proceedings but
not liqmdatIon proceedings. In liqmdatIon the estate IS wound up
and the seller-bankrupt's mterest m the property mcluding legal
title, presumably will be sold. It IS not clear whether the buyer at
thIS sale IS then subject to the control of the bankruptcy court or
how a deed to the ongmal buyer could ultimately be executed. 76
VI.

CONCLUSION

Consumers, whether as bankrupts or creditors of the bank
rupt, while not receIvmg the proportionate conSIderation accorded
owners or finanCIers of shoppmg centers77 m the Bankruptcy Re
form Act, have at least receIved recognitIon for some of theIr spe
CIal problems. As creditors, consumers mability to protect them
selves m speCIal deposit situatIOns has been recogmzed. The $900
limitation on recovery seems adequate to cover most small depos
its, and the fifth pnority category of unsecured creditors offers rea
sonable hope of substantial payment. The present claIms proce
dure, however, IS far too cumbersome for the small amounts
mvolved m consumer creditor litigation. The new bankruptcy rules
should prOVIde for some sort of automatic recognitIon of these po
tentIal claIms to mcrease the practical benefit of the new prOVISIons
to most consumers. Consumers and other buyers of real estate
through the use of contracts now have greater protectIon m event
of the seller s bankruptcy Litigation will almost certamly be neces
sary to clarify some areas. Similarly lessors of bankrupt landlords
73. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365 (West Supp. 1979).
74. ld. § 365(j). ThIS same lien relief IS available for purchaser not III possesSlOn.
75. ld. § 365(h).
76. There are Similar, less complex, problems with lease holds when the lessor
becomes bankrupt. See note 66 supra.
77. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(b)(3) (West Supp. 1979).
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are accorded greater protections, although uncertamty still remams
due to Congress lack of recognition of the legal complexities of
leaseholds.
While consumer bankrupts have not been gIVen the full mea
sure of protection under the Bankruptcy Reform Act that the Bank
ruptcy CommIsSIOn and some consumer advocates desIred, the
"fresh start" prOVISIOns of the old Bankruptcy Act have been en
hanced m a number of areas. In states with stmgy exemptIon laws,
the BRA creates a federal floor on exemptIons. In those states,
voluntary bankruptcy IS encouraged because federally exempt
property otheTWlse subject to levy under state law would remaIn
the debtor s upon bankruptcy It IS perhaps for thIS reason that
the very peculiar prOVISIon permittmg states to elect not to use the
federal exemptions was mserted. 78 The mcreased ability of the
debtor to aVOId both consensual and nonconsensual liens on ex
empt and abandoned property and redemptIon as of nght of prop
erty subject to a security mterest should mcrease the usable prop
erty left to the debtor after bankruptcy
The direct economIC effect on consumer credit of these "fresh
start" provlSlons, while mcalculable, IS probably not great. TheIr m
direct effect IS a different questIon. As thIS artIcle has attempted to
demonstrate, these prOVlSlons work mdirectly to discourage reaffir
matIons of debts. The prOVISIOns of the Act dealing directly with
reaffirmatIon are of uncertam utility although most extreme forms
of abuse should be prevented. Much depends on how they are m
terpreted by the courts.
Most obscure m effect are the anttdiscnmmatton prOVISIOns.
While these could be of substantIal SIgnificance, they may amount
to nothmg at all, depending once agam on the courts application of
the pnncIples.

78.

[d. § 522(b)(I).

